Systems that authenticate a user based on a shared secret (such as a password or PIN) normally allow anyone to query whether the secret is a given value. For example, an ATM machine allows one to ask whether a string is the secret PIN of a (lost or stolen) ATM card. Yet such queries are prohibited in any model whose programs satisfy an informationflow property like Noninterference.
that authenticate a user based on a shared secret (such as a password or PIN) normally allow anyone to query whether the secret is a given value. For example, an ATM machine allows one to ask whether a string is the secret PIN of a (lost or stolen) ATM card. Yet such queries are prohibited in any model whose programs satisfy an informationflow property like Noninterference.
But there is complexitybased justification for allowing these queries. A type system is given that provides the access control needed to prove that no well-typed program can leak secrets in polynomial time, or even leak them with nonnegligible probability if secrets are of sufficient length and randomly chosen. However, there are well-typed deterministic programs in a synchronous concurrent model capable of leaking secrets in linear time.
Introduction
A common approach to authenticating a user is based on a shared secret. Normally, anyone can ask whether the secret is a particular value. For instance, password-based authentication allows anyone to ask whether a certain string is the password of a given user. An ATM permits anyone to ask, for a given card, whether a string is the hidden PIN (Personal ID Number) of that card, and so on. Formalizing the secrecy guaranteed by systems that use this form of authentication is beyond the scope of information-flow techniques because their goal is absolute secrecy.
For instance, suppose h is a constant (read-only variable) whose value is a Ic-bit integer secret. If we represent a query as match(e), which is true iff h = e, then a brute-force attack on h can be represented by a simple loop: 1 := 0; while -match(Z) do z:=z+1
An information-flow property like Noninterference [5, 15, 12, 141 rejects the program.
Given that h has security class H (high) and 2 has security class L (low), Noninterference requires that the final value of 1 be independent of the initial value of h-this plainly fails here. But the loop is a 0(2k) attack, assuming the value of h is chosen at random. So as long as k is large enough and the value of h is randomly chosen, we do not consider the attack a threat and would like a secrecy criterion that reflects this view. Our approach is to adopt a relative criterion for secrecy that depends upon certain parameters, specifically, the number of bits in a secret and randomness.
The idea is to admit only those programs for which it can be proved that sufficiently-long secrets cannot be learned in polynomial time or even learned with nonnegligible probability in polynomial time if randomly chosen. The query expression match(e) also represents the most basic tool any attacker has for compromising public-key cryptography.
Given ciphertext c that is the result of encrypting plaintext h with a public key, an attacker can test efficiently whether h is a particular string e simply by encrypting e with the public key and seeing whether the same ciphertext c is produced. Of course the nonuniform distribution of plaintext makes cracking a public-key system with match queries different from a brute-force attack on a random secret. Good dictionary attacks exploit the distribution. In this case, match queries may not be justified from a complexity standpoint and another cryptographic system may be required. In this paper, we consider the problem of trying to learn the k-bit integer value of a constant h of type H using welltyped programs written in a deterministic programming language with match queries. We require that programs be well typed in the system of [15] , except that we allow the type of match queries to be L, which destroys traditional Noninterference properties.
Instead, we argue for the security of our language by proving that no well-typed program that is capable of deducing h runs in time bounded by a polynomial in k (the size of h). Notice that such a result appears to separate P and JVP (see pg. 373 of [ll] ), as a well-typed nondeterministic program can guess h and verify its guess with match in time linear in k. But our result actually separates relativized forms of P and n/P because of our use of the match oracle. This sort of separation was shown long ago [l] .
The preceding guarantee is the best one can do in the absence of any probability distribution for the values of h. In the case where there is a distribution, we can talk about the probability of successfully learning h. We show that if the value of h is chosen with respect to a uniform probability distribution, then for any well-typed polynomial-time program c, the probability that c successfully learns h goes to zero as Ic increases.
One might conclude that equality testing is safe in general, and that we could simply give el = e2 type L, regard-less of the types of el and e2.' However, this is not so; it then becomes possible to leak a secret in linear time.
Finally, we consider the effect of adding concurrency to the language. Unlike our previous work [12, 141, we consider a synchronous form of concurrency, so that programs remain deterministic.
We show that synchronous concurrency, even without match queries, allows well-typed programs to leak secrets in linear time.
2 The deterministic language
In this paper, we consider a deterministic imperative programming language with a query primitive match:
text) e ::= 2 1 n 1 h 1 match(e) 1 el + e2 1 el < e2 1 el = e2 1 el #e2
(cmds) c ::= skip I x := e I ci;cs 1 if e then ci else cs ( while e do c Metavariable a: ranges over identifiers that are mapped by memories to integers; n ranges over integer literals. Integers are the only values; we use 0 for false and nonzero for true. The special identifier h is a read-only variable whose binding we assume is secret.
A standard transition semantics for the language is given in Figure 1 . A memorgl p is a mapping from identifiers to integers. We assume that expressions are evaluated atomically.
Thus we simply extend a memory in the obvious way to map expressions to integers, writing p(e) to denote the value of expression e in memory ,u. We say that p(match(e)) = 1 ifFp(h) = p(e); otherwise p(match(e)) = 0. Note that expressions do not have side effects, nor do they contain partial operations like division. Thus p(e) is defined for all e, so long as every identifier in e is in dam(p).
These rules define a transition relation -+ on configurations. A configuration is either a pair (c,~) or simply a memory ,Q. In the first case, c is the command yet to be executed; in the second case, the command has terminated, yielding final memory p. As usual, we define K +' K, for any configuration 1c, and K +k K", for k > 0, if there is a configuration K' such that K -+k-1 K' and K' + K". 3 
Relative secrecy
We begin by looking at relative secrecy properties that can be proved for programs that access h via match queries only. Then, in Section 5, we give a reduction that extends these results to programs that may have free occurrences of h. The reduction requires that these programs be well typed under the type system of Section 4. The first property is an intractability guarantee: Theorem 3.1 There is no deterministic command capable of copying the k-bit integer value of h into Q variable 1 in time polynomaal in k, for all k, if h as accessed via match queries only.
Proof. Suppose c runs in polynomial time p(k) where k is the number of bits needed to encode the value of h. Choose k large enough so that 2" > p(k) + 1. Since c can make at most p(k) queries and 2" > p(k) + 1, there are k-bit integers 21n contrast, 5 is clearly dangerous, as it atlows a secret to be computed by binary search.
i and j such that i # j and neither i nor j is queried by c. Now c must copy the value i into 1 when the value of h is i. But if it does, then it also copies i into 1 when the value of h is j, since it is deterministic and does not query j. 0
Notice that if commands were nondeterministic, then a command could nondeterministically choose an integer n and then issue a query match(n). If the query succeeds, it copies n into 1. So we can always copy the value of h in nondeterministic polynomial time.
The preceding guarantee is the best one can do in the absence of any probability distribution on the values of h, or in other words, when its values are chosen nondeterministically. When there is a probability distribution for h, we can talk about the probability of copying h. Indeed, in this case, a command might succeed often, perhaps even most of the time, in copying h. However, one can show that if access to h is limited to match queries, then any deterministic, polynomial-time command for copying h to a variable I will succeed with only negligible probability for uniformlydistributed and sufficiently-large values of h. Suppose c is a deterministic command that runs in polynomial time p(k) and accesses a constant h via match queries only. And suppose the value of h is a k-bit integer, chosen with respect to some probability distribution d on k-bit integers.
Finally, assume that k is large enough so that 2'" > p (k) . Now, as c runs, it makes match queries in an attempt to learn h. If any such query gets result 1, then c can put the correct value into I and halt. But in p(k) time, c can query at most p(k) out of the 2" possible values of h. Since 2k > p(k), all of c's queries might get result 0. In such a run, c must eventually halt and put some value v into 1. But note that since c is deterministic and accesses h only through match queries, c's behavior will be exactly the same if the value of h is any of the unqueried integersin any such run, c will make exactly the same sequence of queries and will finally write the same default value w into 1. That is, for any such c we can identify a set S of at most p (k) integers that c will query, and a default value v that c will write into 1 if all of the queries get result 0. It follows that c will be successful in copying the value of h into I if and only if the value of h is in S U {u}.
Given distribution d, how can c maximize its probability of success? Clearly, the best strategy is to choose S and v so that d(S U {v}) is as large as possible. This can be done by choosing the p(k) + 1 most likely values under d, putting p(k) of them into S, and using the remaining value as V. The probability of success may be high if either k is too small or the probability distribution d is severely skew. But if d is a uniform distribution, so that all possible values of h are equally likely, then for any choice of p(k) + 1 elements of SU {v} we have d(SU{u}) = qp.
(Indeed, we can see that a uniform distribution minimizes c's probability of success.) Hence we have proved Theorem 3.2 If the value of h is a uniformly distributed k-bit integer and c is a deterministic command that runs in polynomial time p(k) and accesses h via match queries only, then the probability that c successfully copies the value of h into a variable 1 is at most (p(k) + 1)/2". Now we wish to allow programs to access h directly, rather than just via match queries. Of course, a program could then simply do I := h, so we need another mechanism to ensure that h is not leaked. For this purpose, we impose a type system.
The types are stratified into data and phrase types:
(data types) 7 ::= L 1 H (phrase types) p ::= T 1 7 var 1 T cmd
The data types are just the security levels low and high. The rules of the type system are given in Figure 2 . They just extend the system of [15] with a rule for match. The rules allow us to prove typing judgments of the form y I-p : p as well as subtyping judgments of the form pl C ~2. Here y is a typing that maps identifiers to types of the form T var, except for h which is mapped by every typing to H. The typing rules for the remaining binary operators are similar to that for EQ. Intuitively, y classifies variables as either high or low, and the typing rules prevent information from flowing from high variables to low variables.
Notice that rule QUERY allows one to assign type L to a query even though that query is against a high constant. It is this rule that breaks Noninterference
[15], for it allows some information about a secret to become public. Also note that the rule allows restricted access to a high constant in the guard of a while loop or conditional without requiring the body or branches to be typed as H cmd. This provides more flexibility in programming, and indeed it now becomes possible to write a conditional that, through an indirect flow, copies a one-bit secret to a low variable. But match is clearly unsafe with a secret of only one bit! 5 The reduction
We reduce the problem of learning the value of h, using a deterministic program whose access to h is limited to match queries, to that of learning the value of h using a well-typed deterministic program (whose access to h is not limited to queries). More precisely, we show that every well-typed command's computation with respect to low variables can be simulated, with no increase in time complexity, by a command whose access to h is restricted to match queries. So learning a secret with any well-typed program is as hard as learning it with only match queries at your disposal. Hence the relative secrecy properties apply to well-typed commands. If a program is not well typed then all bets are off, as it could well be the case that a secret is easily leaked via a direct or indirect flow.
We begin with some definitions: This definition requires two memories to agree on the contents of all low variables. Definition 5.2 We say that a command c is a low command with respect to y if y(x) = L vor for evemj free identijier 2 in c.~ 3Note that this is not the same as saying that the command has type L cmd, as every well-typed command has type L cmd. (c,,u) +n PI, there is a CL" and M such that (c', p) --+m p", p'wy,u" and m < n.
The reduction is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 If c is a well-typed command with respect to y, then there is a low simulation of c with respect to y.
A proof of the theorem is given in the Appendix.
The essence of the proof is that commands of type H cmd cannot affect any low variable. Therefore, they can be replaced by the skip command. Commands that cannot be given type H cmd are retained. The result is a command that preserves the computation on low variables and runs in time bounded by that of the original command.
Since a low command is limited to accessing h via match queries, we have the following corollaries:
in
The essence of this sort of attack can be formulated within the synchronous concurrent model. To formulate it concretely, let us introduce the bitwise operators e (ones complement), & (bitwise and), I (bitwise or) and >> (right shift). Typing rules for these operators are similar to that of rule EQ. We also take the liberty to introduce a while loop with empty body. Now suppose h stores a k-bit secret that is being inspected bitwise by a legitimate thread that simply loops through all bits, doing some computation if a bit is nonzero and nothing otherwise.
Think of the thread as an implementation of an encryption algorithm where less time is required if a bit of the k-bit secret key is zero. The inspection thread is given by the following command:
Corollary 5.2 There is no well-typed deterministic command capable of copying the k-bit integer value of h to a low variable in time polynomaal in k, for all k. Thus we have shown that the secrecy of h is (practically speaking) preserved even if programs are allowed to make match queries f%eely. One might conclude from this that equality testing is harmless in general. However, this is not so. If we allow general equality tests among high expressions to have type L, then we can leak h in linear time: There would be another identical pair for the next bit, except they would spin while waiting for mask to become 64, and so on. The inspection and attack threads share mask which is a low variable.4 Further, all threads are well typed and every attack thread is a low command which we would expect since an attack would not have direct access to variables storing secrets anyway. We have set up a race where the thread that sets a bit of 1 to 6 wins the race iR the corresponding bit of h is ~b. 6 Synchronous concurrency Now consider a deterministic, multi-threaded semantics where all threads execute simultaneously and synchronously. Threads are commands that communicate via a shared global memory. Every thread of a multi-threaded program can make one transition, according to the semantics of Figure 1 , in a given clock cycle. At each step, parallel reads are allowed but not parallel writes. The latter situation causes an evaluation to get stuck.
The synchronous behavior of the model provides welltyped commands with a timing channel that can be exploited to leak a secret perfectly in time linear in its size. Examples of multi-threaded programs capable of doing this can be found in timing attacks on implementations of cryptography [7] . Here there are bit-wise operations on a secret key and one exploits the fact that the implementation is optimized according to certain bits of the key. An example is the C implementation of the block cipher algorithm IDEA To illustrate the behavior, suppose the first two bits of h are 01 and that mask is initially 128. The trace of the inspection thread on this input is given in the first column of Figures 3 and 4 . Figure 3 shows the trace of a thread pair attacking the first bit of h while Figure 4 shows the trace of a thread pair attacking the second bit. The type system is not equipped to deal with this kind of model where timing observations can be made. nicks like atomicity for all n.5 In other words, one can be certain that h stores a particular secret if the algorithm says so. This is an ideal probabilistic algorithm. But consider an interleaving semantics where at each step of executing a multi-threaded program, exactly one thread is chosen to execute for a single transition. Now multi-threaded programs are nondeterministic. If at every step, every thread has a nonzero probability of being selected by a scheduler, then Pr[h = n 1 I = n] < 1, for all 71, unless Pr[h = n] = 1. That's because the final value of I can be any value with nonaero probability, regardless of h. Each value of musk will be considered, allowing the thread pair for the bit in question to execute, and these two threads can complete in either order with nonzero probability. So Pr[E = n 1 h # n] > 0.
The example shows that there are attacks that are stronger in a synchronous concurrent model than in a probabilistic interleaving one. For each new model, one needs to investigate the feasibility of revealing secrets.
Discussion
It has long been recognized that practical information flow control must allow for declassifying information.
An example is a simple password checker. It must indicate whether a given string matches a user's password in a password file. Information-flow control would prohibit the result of such an attempt fkom being observed by an arbitrary user. One way around this restriction is to allow privileged users to explicitly declassify the result, allowing some information to leak [9] . If a password checker merely returns the result of a match query, then the declassification could be justified knowing that any attempt to exploit the checker in order 'When we run the algorithm and it terminates with [ = n, we want to be able to conclude that h = n with some probability. The conditional probability Pr[l = n 1 h = n] is wrong for this purpose. If Pr[[ = 12 1 h = n] = .99,say,and we run the algorithm for some value of h and it terminates with 1 = T%, then this does not imply h = n with probability .99. The same argument applies to probabilistSc primality testing algorithms [2] .
to learn a password is subject to the limitations of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Note we have said nothing about the role of the type system at this point. Type checking would be performed on any program that updates the password file, since this is where new passwords are input. As long as the password checker merely returns the result of a match query, password updating is well typed, and passwords are stored in a secret (high) file, the password system as a whole is secure in the sense that it is subject to the Limitations of Corollaries 5.2 and 5. 3 .
But what can we say about the security of a system in which there is a publac file containing the images of the passwords under some one-way function?
The reduction of Theorem 5.1 can also be used to argue for security in this case. Suppose we add to our deterministic language a function f that we believe is a one-way function [ll] and a constant fh bound to the image of h under f. That is, ,~(fh) = p(f(h)), for any memory I-L. Further, suppose they are typed as y t-fi : L, and for any expression e, yl-e:r y t-f(e) : 7
One cannot allow f(e) to be typed low unless e can be typed as a low expression.
Otherwise, we can copy h into a low variable 1 in linear time using a well-typed program similar to the one in Section 5: Notice that this program might fail to copy every bit of h due to a collision caused by f. But this would be unlikely if f is indeed a one-way function. Also note that j7z makes match unnecessary: if y t-e : L then the expression fi = f(e) can, practically speaking, be used in place of match(e).
We wish to argue for the security of any well-typed program c that uses f. Now c may have free occurrences of h and can call f according to the typing rules above. Suppose that c can copy h into a low variable, for all k-bit values of h, in time t (k) . By Theorem 5.1, we can construct a low simulation c' of c that does the same thing as efficiently. That is, given only fh and all calls to f that c makes involving only low variables, c' can also copy h in t(lc) time. In effect, c' is an algorithm for deducing h from fi using some number (as a function of Ic) of calls to f. So any lower bound on this problem applies to copying h with a well-typed program.
Although we suggest above that match could be replaced, the preceding argument does not subsume our results about the security of programs that access h using match only. For instance, the preceding argument about f does not prove an intractability result for programs limited to accessing h via jh, as Theorem 3.1 does for match. We have only argued that the hardness of copying h using a well-typed program with references to jh and calls to f rests squarely upon the hardness of inverting f. Turing reductions have also been used in proving the security of RSA-based signature schemes [3, 41 and cryptographic protocols [6, 81. Again the basic idea is to prove that the security of a protocol rests on the strength of its cryptographic primitives.
Our synchronous concurrency example shows that if an intruder can observe the timing behavior of an implementation of a cryptographic operation, then the specification of a protocol that uses the operation cannot realistically treat it as primitive. A reduction may not exist because of timing observations, as our example shows. Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of c.
We first consider the case when y l-c : H cmd. In this case, we can simply let the low simulation of c be skip. For by the Confinement lemma below, c does not assign to any variable z for which y(z) = L var. Hence if (c, p) -+" ,Q', then p'wrp.
And we have (skip,p) +l ~1, by rule NO-OP.
Finally, we note that n 2 1 and that skip is a low command with respect to y. Next we consider the case when y y c : H cmd. In this case we must have y l-c : L cmd (since c is well typed under y) and the derivation must end with a trivial application of rule SUBTYPE (since otherwise we would have y l-c : H cmd). We now consider the possible forms of c:
Case skip. Since y t-skip : H cmd, this case has already been handled.
Case z := e. By the discussion above, there is a derivation of y l-x := e : L cmd that ends with an application of rule ASSIGN. This implies that y(z) = L vor and y l-e : L. So, by the Simple Security lemma below, y(y) = L var for every identifier y free in e. Therefore x := e is itself a low command relative to y, and x := e is thus (trivially) a low simulation of itself.
Case if e then cl else cs. Again by the discussion above, there is a derivation of y !-if e then cl else c2 : L cmd that ends with an application of rule IF. Hence y k e : L and both ci and cs are well typed with respect to y. Then by induction there exist commands C~ and ck which are low simulations of cl and ~2, respectively, with respect to y. We claim that if e then ci else c: is a low simulation of if e then CL else cz with respect to y. First, note that it is a low command under y, since (by the Simple Security lemma) y(z) = L var for every free identifier z in e. Next, suppose that p is a memory such that dam(p) = dam(y) and (if e then ci else cs,~) +n ,u'. Then if p(e) # 0, the evaluation has the form (if e then cl else c~,,u) + (cl,~) +"-' p'.
Therefore, since ci is a low simulation of cl, there exists a memory p" P'"rP "
and an integer m such that (c'i,~) +" cl", and m i: n -1. Therefore, by rule BRANCH,
(if e then c; else CL, p) + (ct , p) +m IL".
And m + 1 5 n. The argument is similar in the case when p(e) = 0. Case cl; cs. As above, there is a derivation of y l-cl; cs : L cmd that ends with an application of rule COMPOSE, implying that cl and c2 are well typed under y. So by induction there exist commands c: and ci which are low simulations of cl and cp, respectively, with respect to y. We claim that c:; CL is a low simulation of cl; c2 under y. For suppose that p is a memory with dom(,u) = dam(y) and (cl; c2, p) tn P'. By Lemma 9.4, there exist k and cc" such that 0 < k < n, (cr,~) jk p", and (cs,$') -+n-k p'. Since c; is a low simulation of cl, there exist Y" and m such that (I$, cl) +m Y", $'N+", and m 5 k. And since c: is a low simulation of ~2, there exist Y' and j such that (CL, p") +j v', ,u'~~u', and j 5 n -k. Now cl is well typed under y and therefore h is not assigned to in cl because y(h) = H (i.e. h is not a variable). So p"(h) = p(h).
Further, c; is a low command, so u"(h) = p(h).
Hence p"(h) = J'(h). Since )(L"N+", p"(h) = v"(h), and ci is a low command, we have (c;, u") -+ u'.6
Therefore, by Lemma 9.5, (c;;c$,p) +m+j Y', And m + j<k+n-k=n. ' Note that this conclusion does not follow simply from the facts that (CL,/&") -9
Y' and p"-7V", queries.
because ch may contain mot& Case while e do ci. As above, there is a derivation of y E while e do CI : L cmd ending with rule WHILE, which implies that y l-e : L and CL is well typed with respect to 7. By induction, there is a low simulation cl of ci with respect to y. We claim that while e do C~ is a low simulation of while e do cl with respect to y. First, it is a low command under y, since (by the Simple Security lemma) y(z) = L var for every free identifier x in e. Next, suppose p is a memory with dam(p) = dam(y) and (while e do cl, p) ---+n 11'. Then by Lemma 9.1, there exist Y' and m such that (while e do ci,~) ---+7n v', P'N+', and m 5 n. 0 Lemma 9.1 Suppose that c' is a low simulation of c with respect to y, c is well typed under y, dom(,u) = dam(y), and (while e do c,~) hrr ,u'. Then there exist Y' and m such that (while e do c',~) ---+m v', P'~~Y', and m 5 n.
Notice here a departure from our earlier work. We can have y t e : L and ~w+,,u' yet ,u(e) # ,u'(e), if /J and ,u' disagree on the value of h. This fact breaks some forms of Noninterference introduced in our earlier work, specifically [12, 13, 141 . These forms are essentially bisimulations which are sensitive to any difference in the value of h. Lemma 9.3 (Confinement) If y t-c : H cmd, then we have y(x) = H var, for every variable x assigned to in c.
